# Third party vessels risk assessment key for safety, pollution prevention and charterer's reputation



Repsol Vetting

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### Main Influencing Bodies controlling Vessel's Risk

**Owner** Management Oil Majors Flag **Vetting** Classification **PSC** Society International & Industry Standards (IMO, OCIMF, SIGTTO, ICS, etc.)

Repsol hasn't got own fleet, all the vessels used by the Group are chartered by service, spot or time.

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## Main Influencing Bodies Controlling Vessel's Risk

- **Ship Owner** who has assumed the responsibility for the operation of the ship from the Owner; responsible for safe management, manning and maintenance; but in the majority of the cases, delegates these tasks in third parties.
- **Flag state** regulate the standards and has jurisdiction over the vessel and is responsible for inspecting that it is safe to sail and to check on the crew's working conditions.
- Classification societies set standards of construction and assess condition; they have found themselves playing in the middle, as Owners request their service but, in some cases, they act on behalf of the flag states and flags didn't conduct their own surveys.
- Port state control administrations inspect foreign vessels.



## Main Influencing Bodies Controlling Vessel's Risk

Root Source of legislative measures: Accidents demonstrated need for change to the industry













1912 - Titanic
South of New
Foundland
Loss of life: > 1500
people
Initiated drafting of
SOLAS

1967 - Torrey Canyon Isles of Scilly,UK Oil spill:110.000 t Initiated drafting of MARPOL

1989 - Exxon Valdez Prince Williams Sound, Alaska Oil spill: 41.000 t Initiated drafting of OPA90

1999 - Erika Bay of Biscay, France Oil spill: 31.000 t

3 legislation packages in the EU to improve safety of shipping

Accelerated phase out of single hulls to carry heavy products

2002 - Prestige Off shore, Spain Oil spill: 77.000 t

Initiated identification and assignment of places of refuge, CAS.

Further accelerated
Phasing out of
Single Hulls

2010 - Deepwater Horizon 4.9 million barrels of Oil 11 deaths

Amendments to
Solas Convention
and the Mobile
Offshore Drilling Unit
Code
(MODU)

## Main Influencing Bodies Controlling Vessel's Risk

**Despite Standards:** 



Many of the requirements appear sufficient
However, sometimes there is a failure to apply and/or enforce them or the compliance is

not mandatory because of the vessel's date of build or size



## Repsol Corporate Norm for Vessels Risk Control

#### **Legal Framework**

462 Norm Managing safety and environment in sea and river operations and/or transport

#### **Object:**

To establish basic guidelines for managing safety and environment in sea/river operations and/or transport within the Repsol Group, to minimize risks that may affect the safety of people, facilities and the environment.

#### **Repsol Vetting:**

Global technical unit responsible for establishing guidelines for the safety and environment assessment process for all vessel types operating in the Repsol system, monitoring compliance with applicable regulations and managing preliminary assessments and physical inspections of vessels when required.



## Repsol Corporate Norm for Vessel Risk

**Control** 

#### What is Repsol vetting?



- ✓ Transparency
- ✓ Integrity
- Responsibility
- ✓ Flexibility
- ✓ Innovation

- Analysis, evaluation and rating process applied to a ship or company before it is contracted
- Online database to request the commercial interest on a vessel, check the vetting status, main particulars, load of Vessel's operability in Repsol Terminals
- ✓ Active system requires positive assessment
- ✓ Safety and Technical in house Department since 1993
- ✓ Objective is to determine whether an operational risk exists
- ✓ Inspections to ensure that all of the vital navigation, safety, firefighting, rescue, loading and unloading, mooring, main and auxiliary engine, etc. is well maintained.
- Assessment of Acceptability is done in Madrid not by the Inspector
- Expertise based system



### Repsol Corporate Norm for Vessel Risk Control

What is Repsol vetting?: People





## Repsol Corporate Norm for Vessel Risk Control

What is Repsol vetting?: People

#### **Keys for Safety: Expertise system**

✓ Every Vetting inspector holds Master or Chief Engineer's licence with a wide experience in navigation.



- ✓ They are all accredited by OCIMF SIRE 1 to perform SIRE inspections in the 3 categories OIL/CHEMICAL/GAS.
- ✓ They have attended the mandatory New Inspector course and passed OCIMF audit
- ✓ In order to maintain the accreditation they must perform a minimum number of inspections per year.
- Every 3 years they must attend to a refreshment course and be re-audited.

### Repsol Corporate Norm for Vessel Risk Control



#### What vetting does and what values promotes?

1.	Safeguard safety of human life	Use of <b>Inert Gas</b>						
2.	Prevention of marine pollution	Use of <b>double hull</b>						
•								
3.	Prevention of Damage to People and enviromental impact	Examination of officer Experience Oil Spill prevention Condition Assesment Program (CAP)						
4.	Reputation	Key for <b>Safeguards</b> charterer's <b>reputation</b>						
•								
<b>5</b> .	Values	Transparency & Integrity Flexibility & responsibility Innovation						

### 1. Safeguard safety of human life



#### Accidents not leading to legislative measures

#### IMO to deliberate inert-gas systems for two more years

Regulators have agreed that the have decided to deliberate over its review from 2009 to 2011. the matter for another two The IMO is also considering pro-

time Organisation (IMO) sub- one on the table from Japan for that the mandatory use of inert- Norway would like to see existgas systems on ships under ingtankers retrofitted with inert-20,000 dwt carrying cargoes with gas systems. a low flash point would "minimise the risk of fires and explo- operator Odfiell, which has sufwhen dozens of seafarers lost tankers in the past, has been opersions five years ago.

Although the general mood is operationally it is workable. for the IMO to enforce the regu- Odfiell vice-president for opdentally entering inerted tanks.

tondon time in ports as a result of the inerting process.

As enclosed-space deaths have mandatory application of inert-recently been raised as a major gas systems to new products and issue for the industry, the IMO chemical tankers under 20,000 has extended the deadline for dwt would save lives but they the working group to conclude posals for changing the size of A recent International Mari- ship to which it applies, such as committee meeting has agreed chemical tankers over 8,000 dwt.

Norwegian chemical-tanker sions". The move was initiated fered explosions on its operated their lives in a series of explo- ating ships with inerting systems on board since 2005 and says that

lation, there is still some concern erational support Svend Fovnover whether inerting tanks Bruun, who is working on the would simply increase the risk IMO subcommittee, tells Tradeof seafarers and surveyors dying Winds that arranging surveys from asphyxiation when acci- and purging tanks well ahead of loading could reduce the extra This is of particular concern time needed for inerting. He with chemical tankers, which adds that sampling rather than require additional cargo-tank full inspection could reduce the surveys to get approval from need to enter cargo tanks, while shippers. There is also the prob- a change to the loading process

lem of additional turn-around could also reduce risk ODFJELL: Has used inerting systems on its vessels since 2005. Photo: Dale E 2004 M/T BOW MARINER M/T NCC MEKKA

Explosion 50 miles off the Virginia coast, 21 deaths

Explosion after departing from Santos

2 deaths

2 deaths

M/T PANAMA SERENA Explosion at Porto Torres

2006 IMO MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 81st. Session Study on 35 incidents of explosions on chemical and product tankers during the past 25 years -None action followed

#### Since IMO doesn't legislate Repsol does it!

From 01.01.09 all the vessels, independently of age and size\*, carrying volatile products for Repsol, products with flash points of 60 degrees Celsius or less, must **use the inert gas system** previous the loading, during transport and discharge.





#### **Use of Inert Gas System**

#### 2012 M/T BUNGA ALPINIA. Explosion at Labuan, Malaysia, Loss of 5 persons





\*Currently, **IMO** inerting requirements are applicable to oil tankers and chemical tankers of **20000** tons of **DWT** and above.

2014-IBC Code, SOLAS and FSS Code have been amended to lower the application of the limit to 8000 dwt for the oil and chemical tankers constructed on after 01 January 2016.

Repsol keeps on being ahead of IMO Legislation

### 2. Prevention of Marine Polution



#### Use of double hull

**MARPOL** bans the carriage of Heavy Grade Oils in single-hull tankers of 600 tons DWT and above but Flags can allow their use in their coastal and internal waters.

**REPSOL** bans it in all the waters where operates.

1st January 2009: Repsol goes beyond IMO Regulations and commits the use of double hull vessels for the transport of any type of crude oil and the storage of crude and all type of oil products regardless of whether they are considered heavy or not.

### REPSOL VETTING PROCESS AND CRITERIA Hull design

- 1. Vessels carrying crude oil must always be double hull.
- 2. Vessels used as floating storage must be **double hull**.

#### **POLLUTION PREVENTION**

- a) A cargo pump room bilge high-level alarm, with at least two sensors (dual safety), located at port and starboard side preferably, is to be fitted and fully operational. If installation is not yet available it should be provided not later than vessel next dry dock.
- b) Storage and service bunker (fuel oil and gas oil) tanks must have high-level alarms.



**Examination of Officer Experience** 

#### **OCIMF Officer Matrix is reviewed**


✓ The maritime system is a people system, and human errors figure prominently in casualty situations. About 75-96% of marine casualties are caused, at least in part, by some form of human error

Officer's Crew Details- LNG								_<	Years i	n servi	ce	
Rank	Nationality	Cert. comp.	Issuing country	Admin. accept	Tanker cert.	STCW V para.	Radio qual.	Oper- ator	Rank	Tanker type	All types	Months tour
Master	Romanian	Class 1	Romania	Yes	Gas	Para 2	Yes	4	6	0.3	0.3	4.3
Chief Officer	Romanian	Class 1	Romania	Yes	Gas	Para 2	Yes	2	0.7	1.3	1.2	8.3

Vetting requires a minimum time of experience with Technical Operator, experience in rank and sailing experience on board the type of tanker in which Officers sail.



**Oil Spill Prevention** 





Oil Spill Prevention. ITOPF OIL Spill Statistics

#### Repsol does not appear on this statistics since 1992

Position	n Shipname	Year	Location	Spill size (tonnes)
1	ATLANTIC EMPRESS	1979	Off Tobago, West Indies	287,000
2	ABT SUMMER	1991	700 nautical miles off Angola	260,000
3	CASTILLO DE BELLVER	1983	Off Saldanha Bay, South Africa	252,000
4	AMOCO CADIZ	1978	Off Brittany, France	223,000
5	HAVEN	1991	Genoa, Italy	144,000
6	ODYSSEY	1988	700 nautical miles off Nova Scotia, Canada	132,000
7	TORREY CANYON	1967	Scilly Isles, UK	119,000
8	SEA STAR	1972	Gulf of Oman	115,000
9	IRENES SERENADE	1980	Navarino Bay, Greece	100,000
10	URQUIOLA	1976	La Coruna, Spain	100,000
11	HAWAIIAN PATRIOT	1977	300 nautical miles off Honolulu	95,000
12	INDEPENDENTA	1979	Bosphorus, Turkey	94,000
13	JAKOB MAERSK	1975	Oporto, Portugal	88,000
14	BRAER	1993	Shetland Islands, UK	85,000
15	AEGEAN SEA	1992	La Coruna, Spain	74,000
16	SEA EMPRESS	1996	Milford Haven, UK	72,000
17	KHARK 5	1989	120 nautical miles off Atlantic coast of Morocco	70,000
18	NOVA	1985	Off Kharg Island, Gulf of Iran	70,000
19	KATINA P	1992	Off Maputo, Mozambique	67,000
20	PRESTIGE	2002	Off Galicia, Spain	63,000
35	EXXON VALDEZ	1989	Prince William Sound, Alaska, USA	37,000
131	HEBEI SPIRIT	2007	Taean, Republic of Korea	11,000
	ALYARMOUK	2015	11 nautical miles NE of Pedra Branca, Singapor	re <b>4.500</b>





**CAP: Condition Assessment Program** 

#### **REPSOL** was pioneer:

- Asking for CAP before CAS (Condition Assessment Scheme)
- Asking for CAPs in LNG Vessels

#### REPSOL VETTING PROCESS AND CRITERIA

#### VI.12. - Condition Assessment Program (CAP)

Vessels 20 years old, or more, and over 5000 MT SDWT, will need at least a CAP 2 (GOOD) rating for hull, machinery and cargo handling system with a validity of 3 years from the last date of CAP survey. Owners should allow sufficient time for renewing the CAP's certificates.

#### VI.13. - Hull Structural Fatigue Analysis

Vessels bigger than 150 m in length and older than 20 years will need a comprehensive fatigue analysis.



#### **CAP: Condition Assessment Program**

Report on THICKNESS MEASUREMENT OF MISCELLANEOUS STRUCTURAL MEMBERS

Structural member						between space DECK Repaired & space DECK								
Structural Member description	AIR PIPES AND VENTILATORS						u space BEOK							
							Excessive cor	rosion						
ocation of Structure	cation of Structure ON THE MAIN DECK (ALONG SUPERSTRUCTURE) see sketch s28							Substantial corrosion						
						N-Av	Orig. Thk Not	Available						
Item	Description	Max Alwd Dim.	Orig. Thk	Max Alwd Dim.	Gai	uged	Dimin	nution P	Diminution S					
		%	mm	mm	Р	S	mm	%	mm	%				
	DIA ~ 70mm													
oint	Point no.1	25	8	2,0		6,2			1,8	22,5				
oint	Point no.2	25	8	2,0		5,4			2,6	32,5				
oint	Point no.3	25	8	2,0		6			2	25				
oint	Point no.4	25	8	2,0		5,8			2,2	27,5				
	PIPE F:													
	DIA ~ 70mm													
oint	Point no.1	25	8	2,0		6,7			1,3	16,3				
oint	Point no.2	25	8	2,0		6,6			1,4	17,5				
oint	Point no.3	25	8	2,0		6,8			1,2	15				
oint	Point no.4	25	8	2,0		6,7			1,3	16,3				
	PIPE G:													
	DIA ~ 70mm													
oint	Point no.1	25	8	2,0		5			3	37,5				
oint	Point no.2	25	8	2,0		6,4			1,6	20				
oint	Point no.3	25	8	2,0		6,2			1,8	22,5				
oint	Point no.4	25	8	2,0		5,5			2,5	31,3				
	PIPE H:													
	DIA ~ 100mm													
oint	Point no.1	25	8,8	2,2		7,3			1,5	17				
oint	Point no.2	25	8,8	2,2		7,2			1,6	18,2				
oint	Point no.3	25	8,8	2,2		7,5			1,3	14,8				
oint	Point no.4	25	8,8	2,2		7,4			1,4	15,9				
	PIPE I:													
										<del>                                       </del>				



- ✓ CAP evaluates the condition of a vessel, comparing it with a new one in a scale that goes from 1 (very good) to 3,4,5 (poor); it depends on the Class Society.
- ✓ REPSOL requires a minimum CAP of 2 (good), a vessel with CAP1 or 2 can not have substantial corrosion.

Ship's name: GITTA KOSAN




### 4. Key for Safeguard Charterer's Reputation

The charterer has now become linked, at least in the public mind, to the operator of the chartered vessel



### 5. Values. Transparency & Integrity






Repsol Vetting participates in OCIMF's SIRE program, 49,6% of Repsol inspections (364) have been submitted to SIRE in 2014, 583 SIRE reports from another Oil Majors have been reviewed.







Repsol Vetting has fully participated in OCIMF's TMSA program. We have reviewed 367 Ship Operator's Self assessment files.





### 5. Values. Flexibility & Responsibility

	2011		2	2012	20	)13	2014		
Preliminary Evaluations	1834	1279 ( 70%) 555 (30%)	1775	1117 (62%) 659 (38%)	1509	807 (53%) 702 (47%)	Th/X	1149 (68%) 529 (32%)	
Vetting Inspections	918	782 (85%) 136 (15%)	933	776 (83%) 157 (17%)	762	651 (85%) 111 (15%)	733	645 (88%) 88 (12%)	
SIRE Inspections	590		515		415		364		
Safety Inspections		16		16		25		85	
Use of third party SIRE inspections	Ę	560		648	467		538		
TMSA Audits	0		0			0	9		

ACCEPTED NON ACCEPTED

Repsol vetting procesess and criteria evolves according to experience and lessons learned



## REPSOL

#### **Sire Report Risk Analysis**

Question	Question text	Answer	Value	Chapter limit
1.22	Date of expiry of the Class Certificate	2015-02- 06	6	17
5.45	Are lifebuoys, lights, buoyant lines, quick release mechanisms and self-activating smoke floats in good order?  Inpector observations: At random lifebuoys were checked and found the MOB and one on deck with a hole, most probably as per maker construction, which could lead to a loss of buoyancy.  Operator first comments: Inspectors comment has been taken seriously into consideration. Indeed the subject hole was below the reflective tape giving no suspicion to identify same. Holes in question were effectively sealed after departure and reflective tape giving no suspicion to identify same. Holes in question were effectively sealed after departure and reflective tape giving no suspicion to identify same. Holes in question were effectively sealed after departure and reflective tape giving no suspicion to identify same. Holes in question were effectively sealed after departure and reflective tape giving no suspicion to identify same. Holes in question were effectively sealed after departure and reflective tape giving no suspicion to identify same. Holes in question were effectively sealed after departure and reflective tape giving no suspicion to identify same. Holes in question were effectively sealed after departure and reflective tape giving no suspicion to identify same. Holes in question were effectively sealed after departure and reflective tape giving no suspicion to identify same. Holes in question were effectively sealed after departure and reflective tape giving no suspicion to identify same.	N	1	7
5.56	Are isolating valves in fire and foam system lines clearly marked and in good order?  Inpector observations: A foam valve, fitted close to the PfV breaker, found not working properly it was difficult to close by hand, the use of a spanner was necessary.  Operator first comments: An isolated case, all fire & foam system valves where checked and found easy to operate. The valve in question was maintained as required upon sailing. A relevant meeting was held by the attending Superintendent who in turn strictly advised the crew regarding the matter and the potential hazards that could occur.  Case will be circulated to the fleet for awareness & compliance in order to avoid recurrence.	N	1	7
11.24	Are hot surfaces, particularly diesel engines, free of any evidence of fuel, diesel and lubricating oil?  Inspector comments: In general all engines, including Main Engine, observed in clean and dry.  Inpector observations: Generator nr 1 observed with moderate lube oil leak from shaft seal.  Operator first comments: As per Masters and Chief Engineers report, minor drops of oil form DG no 1 sealing ring have been eliminated.  Source of drops leaks was the clogged drain hole of shaft sealing ring which was rectified on the day after.  Case will be circulated to the fleet for awareness & compliance in order to avoid recurrence.	N	1	8

Our system detects High Risk Observations from SIRE Reports and highlights them.

Vessels with more than 8 points are rejected by the system and assessed by our team.

Final status: Rejected



### **THANK YOU**

# Third party vessels risk assessment key for safety, pollution prevention and charterer's reputation



Repsol Vetting